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LABOR LAW-PICKETING-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
First Amendment Challenges by Federal Employees 
to the Broad Labor Picketing Proscription 
of Executive Order 11491 
[There is] a growing vocal element among federal employees ••• 
throughout the country-and its tune is one of resentment against 
what it claims is a "Second-Class" citizenship . ••• [P]icketing and 
protests are cropping up around the nation •••. 1 
J. INTRODUCTION 
In 1967, the White House was picketed by federal employees for 
the first time in history.2 Although some 1,700 National Postal Union 
(NPU) members took part in the peaceful picketing of the executive 
mansion in protest of what they considered to be "peanut pay raises," 
no disciplinary measures were imposed upon the NPU or its mem-
bers.3 However, one year later, a New York local of the National 
I. Government Employee Relations Report [hereinafter G.E.R.R.] No. 208, at A9 
(Sept. 4, 1967), See dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in United Pub. Workers v. 
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 124 (1947), quoted in note 100 infra. 
2. G.E.R.R. No. 208, at A9 (Sept. 4, 1967). See also G.E.R.R. No. 194, at A4-A5 (May 
29, 1967). 
3. Id. That such disciplinary action could probably have been taken against the 
National Postal Union (NPU) is demonstrated by the language of then-existing 
§ 3.2(b) of the federal government's Code of Fair Labor Practices (CFLP), Memorandum 
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Association of Government Employees (NAGE). which engaged in 
similar peaceful picketing, did not fare as well. 
In National Association of Government Employees v. White 
(NAGE),4 after an impasse had been reached in collective bargaining 
negotiations between the Environmental Science Services Adminis-
tration of the Department of Commerce and the NAGE, twenty-two 
union members peacefully picketed in front of the building in which 
they worked as United States weathermen. The members also passed 
out leaflets to the public that specifically indicated that the members 
were not on strike.5 The picketing was performed on the members' 
own time, and there were no interruptions of any government ser-
vices. Nonetheless, for the first time in the history of the federal gov-
ernment's labor relations program, sanctions were imposed upon a 
union.6 Mr. Robert White, Administrator of the Environmental Sci-
ence Services Administration, decided that the NAGE demonstration 
fell within the "picketing" prohibition of section 3.2(b)(4) of the 
Code of Fair Labor Practices (CFLP),7 which prohibited unions from 
picketing the federal government. As punishment for this violation, 
he canceled the union's recognition and dues-checkoff rights for a 
period of one year.8 The NAGE then brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia for a ·writ of man-
damus ordering Administrator White to reinstate the terminated 
rights on the ground that the disciplinary action constituted a de-
privation of the NAGE members' first amendment guarantees. The 
district court, basing its decision on the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.9 On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and 
of May 21, 1963, 3 C.F.R. 848-54 (comp. 1959-1963) (superseded Jan. 1, 1970), which 
had been authorized by § 13(a) of President Kennedy's 1962 Executive Order, Em-
ployee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 
C.F.R. 526 (comp. 1959-1963). See H. ROBERTS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE 40 (1968). CFLP § 3.2 provided, inter alia: "Employee organizations 
are prohibited from: ••• (4) calling or engaging in any strike, work stoppage, slow-
down, or related picketing engaged in as a substitute for any such strike, work stoppage 
or slowdown, against the Government of the United States •••• " 3 C.F.R. 852-53 
(comp. 1959-1963) (emphasis added). Under CFLP § 3.3(c), "remedies and sanctions" 
could be imposed by the appropriate federal agency for violations of § 3.2(b)(4). 3 
C.F.R. 854 (comp. 1959-1963). 
4. No. 1617-68 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 1968), revd., 418 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied sub nom. Zimmerman v. United States, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). 
5. The leaflets advocated the passage of congressional bills that would grant recog-
nition to federal-employee unions and urged the public to write their Congressmen 
concerning certain injustices and inefficiencies at the Weather Bureau. 418 F.2d at 1128. 
6. See G.E.R.R. No. 243, at Al (May 6, 1968), and G.E.R.R. No. 251 at A5-A7 ijuly 
1, 1968). 
7. CFLP § 3.2(b)(4), Memorandum of May 21, 1963, 3 C.F.R. 853 (comp. 1959-1963). 
8. 418 F.2d at 1126. 
9. National Assn. of Govt. Employees v. White, No. 1617-68 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 1968), 
reported in G.E.R.R. No. 271, at Al-A2 (Nov. 18, 1968). 
April 1971) Notes 959 
remanded the case for a determination of the merits, holding that 
the action did not "founder on any rock of sovereign immunity."10 
Although section 3.2(b)(4) of the CFLP has since been displaced 
by President Nixon's Executive Order 11,491, "Labor-Management 
Relations in the Federal Service,"11 the constitutional questions 
raised by the NAGE situation are still highly pertinent, especially 
for the 1,500,000 federal employees who are presently in collective 
bargaining units exclusively represented by labor organizations.12 
Section 19(b) of the new Executive Order provides, inter alia: "A 
labor organization shall not ... (4) call or engage in a strike, work 
stoppage, or slowdown; picket any agency in a labor-management 
dispute; or condone any such activity by failing to take affirmative 
action to prevent or stop it ... .''13 This Note will consider the con-
stitutional validity of section 19(b)(4)'s broad prohibition against fed-
eral-employee labor picketing. However, before the first amendment 
questions are considered, two preliminary issues should be discussed. 
II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
The district court in NAGE based its summary dismissal on the 
theory of sovereign immunity.14 This jurisdictional doctrine is de-
rived from the historical notion that "the king can do no ·wrong" 
and from the premise that "[t]he interference of the courts with the 
performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of 
the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief."15 
Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the courts 
have no general supervisory power over the proceedings and ac-
tions of administrative bodies in the government16 and that "a 
suit against the Government [is one] over which the court, in the 
absence of consent, has no jurisdiction."17 
10. 418 F.2d at 1129-30. For a discussion of the district and circuit courts' reasoning, 
see text accompanying notes 14-24 infra. 
11. 3 C.F.R. 191-205 (comp. 1969). On January 1, 1970, this Executive Order wholly 
displaced prior Executive Order 10,988. See note 3 supra. 
12. See G.E.R.R. No. 297, at Dl-D6 (May 19, 1969). 
13. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 19(b)(4), 3 C.F.R. 202-03 (comp. 1969) (emphasis 
added). 
14. See text accompanying note 9 supra. 
15. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840). 
16. Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 292 (1900). See also Mississippi v. Johnson, 
71 U.S. 475 (1866), in which the Court utilized the separation-of-powers rationale to 
reach the conclusion that sovereign immunity bars a court from restraining the actions 
of either the Congress or the President. For an opposing view, see Justice Brandeis' 
dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926): "The doctrine of the separa-
tion of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to 
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by 
means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers 
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy." 
17. Larson v. Domestic 8: Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949). 
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Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit had previously relied upon the sovereign immunity doctrine to 
dismiss similar federal-employee-organization challenges to Govern-
ment officials' conduct,18 it concluded that the particular circum-
stances involved in NA GE placed that case within one of the two 
generally recognized exceptions to the doctrine. The Supreme Court 
has held that the sovereign immunity rule does not apply when an 
officer's actions exceed his statutory powers or when the power it-
self or the manner in which it is exercised is constitutionally void.19 
Under either of these circumstances, according 'to the Court in Lar-
son v. Domestic b Foreign Commerce Corporation,20 the officer 
becomes dissociated from the sovereign so that "his actions . . . 
are considered individual and not sovereign actions."21 Thus, the 
suit is viewed as being against the individual officer rather than the 
sovereign. As a result of this reasoning, the Court has held that 
sovereign immunity does not bar actions that fall under one of these 
two exceptions.22 
The plaintiffs in NAGE alleged that Administrator White's ac-
tions were unconstitutional because they unduly interfered with 
the employees' first amendment rights to assemble, to speak freely, 
and to petition Congress.23 Accepting such allegations, the court of 
appeals properly concluded that because the plaintiffs' claim arose 
under the Constitution, that claim fell under the exception of con-
stitutional invalidity and hence was within the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. 24 
18. See National Assn. of Internal Revenue Employees v. Dillon, 356 F.2d 811 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966); Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). 
19. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 
(1962). In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908), the Court recognized that 
the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act • • • is a 
proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the State in 
its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part 
of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce 
a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. 
20. 337 U.S. 682 (1949). 
21. 337 U.S. at 689. 
22. 337 U.S. at 689-90. See also Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962). For extended 
discussions of the applicability of the sovereign immunity doctrine to judicial review 
of federal administrative action, see Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" 
Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 1479 (1962); Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: 
The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 
and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 389 (1970); Davis, Suing the Government by 
Falsely Pretending To Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1962); Scalia, Sovereign 
Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclu-
sions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 867 (1970). 
23. 418 F.2d at 1129. 
24. 418 F.2d at 1129. In holding that the plaintiffs had alleged a claim arising under 
the Constitution, the court emphasized that "even where a privilege that has been 
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Once the sovereign immunity hurdle is cleared, there are two 
methods by which the constitutionality of Executive Order ll,49l's 
no-labor-picketing provision might be challenged in the courts.25 
A suit seeking declaratory relief could immediately be brought 
under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act,26 or a challenge 
could be made following the imposition of disciplinary measures 
after a labor organization had actually engaged in the proscribed 
activity.27 By either method, the suit would best be processed against 
the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations 
since, under section 6(a)(4) of the Executive Order,28 he is given the 
responsibility for the resolution of unfair labor practice complaints.29 
extended [by executive discretion] is capable of unilateral revocation, [as here,] the 
administration of that privilege cannot be exercised in a manner which clashes with 
basic constitutional safeguards. Judicial relief is available even when the privilege is not 
rooted in a statute." 418 F.2d at lll!O. See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 345 (1955); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); 
Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: The President and the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REv. 
141 (1952); Williams, The Impact of the Steel Seizures upon the Theory of Inherent 
Sovereign Powers of the Federal Government, 5 S.C.L.Q. 5 (1952), See also Georgia 
R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign 
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); 
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S 605 (1912); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); 
3 K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE§ 27.03 (1958); Byse, supra note 22; Cramton, 
supra note 22; Hochman, Judicial Review of Administrative Processes in Which the 
President Participates, 74 HARv. L. REv. 684 (1961); Comment, Immunity of Government 
Officers: Effects of the Larson Case, 8 STAN. L. REv, 683 (1956). But cf. Mine Safety 
Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945); Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925). 
Despite an allegation of unconstitutional government action, it might still be possible 
to argue that sovereign immunity should prevent the attainment of satisfactory relief 
when "the relief requested can not be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the 
conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by the sovereign or the dis-
position of unquestionably sovereign property." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce 
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11 (1949). However, in a case involving § 19(b)(4) of Executive 
Order ll,491, appropriate relief would clearly not require affirmative action to be taken 
by the sovereign but would instead require only the cessation of illegal action or the 
reinstatement of an improperly terminated right by a relatively minor Government 
official-the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations, who, under 
the Executive Order, is responsible for the administration of the unfair labor practice 
provision. See notes 28-29 infra and accompanying text. For further explication of this 
aspect of sovereign immunity, see 3 K. DAVIS, supra, § 27.01 (Supp. 1965). 
25. The order could also be challenged in a defense to a suit brought by the 
Government to enjoin picketing in violation of the order. However, because of the 
constitutional problems of the order, see pt. V infra, the Government would undoubt-
edly apply administrative sanctions-such as those invoked in NAGE or even firing-
rather than place the order directly in issue in a judicial proceeding. 
26. 28 u.s.c. §§ 2201-02 (1964). 
27, Subject matter jurisdiction is clearly present in either event, for "where the 
complaint ••• is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution ••• the 
federal court ••• must entertain the suit." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946). 
28. 3 C.F.R. 195 (comp. 1969). See Special Supplement to G.E.R.R. No. 320, at 5 (Oct. 
27, 1969). 
29. This concentration of responsibility constituted a change from the practice that 
had existed under the prior CFLP; that code authorized each separate agency to remedy 
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Although there is no doubt that a court could entertain a suit 
by a labor organization that had been disciplined for violating 
the Executive Order's antipicketing provision,30 there is a possi-
bility that a court would refuse to grant previolation relief in 
the form of a declaratory judgment on the ground that the issue 
was not ripe for determination. In United Public Workers v. 
Mitchell,31 several federal employees brought suit seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the Hatch Act,32 which limited the right 
of Government workers to engage in political activity, was uncon-
stitutional. Although the employees alleged that their constitutional 
freedoms were infringed by the threat of punishment under the Act, 
they had not engaged in any actual conduct that subjected them 
to disciplinary action. The Supreme Court stated that 
federal courts do not render advisory opinions. For adjudication of 
constitutional issues, "concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, 
not abstractions," are requisite. . . . The power of courts • . . to 
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when 
the interests of litigants require the use of . . . judicial authority 
for their protection against actual interference. A hypothetical 
threat is not enough. 33 
Because of these considerations, the Court dismissed the appeal of 
the appellants who were seeking declaratory relief.34 
Subsequent cases, however, have greatly undermined the broad 
doctrine enunciated in Mitchell concerning justiciability. In Dom-
browski v. Pfister,35 for example, the Court was faced with a suit 
for declaratory relief from an allegedly overbroad state statute that 
purportedly threatened appellants' constitutional rights to freedom 
of expression.36 Although no prosecution had been processed against 
the appellants under the statute in question, the Court decided that 
the issue presented was justiciable and held the state law unconstitu-
unfair labor practice violations. See CFLP § 3.3, Memorandum of May 21, 1963, 3 C.F.R. 
853-54 (comp. 1959-1963). 
30. In such a case, the disciplinary sanctions would provide the basis for a case or 
controversy between the union and the agency. 
31. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
32. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, § 9, 53 Stat. 1148, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118i 
(1964). 
33. 330 U.S. at 89-90. See also 330 U.S. at 90 n.22. 
34. While the Court's language regarding ripeness was very broad, it should be 
emphasized that an additional factor was present in that case. Since one appellant bad 
actually sustained adverse action as a result of bis previous political activity, the Court 
was willing to render a determination of the merits with respect to his appeal. 330 U.S. 
at 91-94. Had one of the appellants not been in such a position, the Court might not 
have reached the same result with respect to the undisciplined appellants. 
35. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
36. The Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, LA. REv. STAT. §§ 
14.358-.374 (Cum. Supp. 1962), made it unlawful to be a member of a Communist-front 
organization and to participate in the management of any subversive organization. 
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tional.81 In rejecting an argument that the issue was not ripe for 
determination, the Court said that when statutes 
have an overbroad sweep . . • the hazard of loss or substantial 
impairment of those precious [first amendment] rights may be 
critical. For in such cases, the statutes lend themselves too readily 
to denial of those rights. The assumption that defense of a criminal 
prosecution will generally assure ample vindication of constitu-
tional rights is unfounded in such cases .... For "[t]he threat of 
sanctions may deter •.• almost as potently as the actual application 
of sanctions. . . ." . • . Because of the sensitive nature of consti-
tutionally protected expression, we have not required that all of 
those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their 
rights. For free expression-of transcendent value to all society, and 
not merely to those exercising their rights-might be the loser.38 
The Court further observed that the threat of prosecutions for pro-
tected expression would continue so long as the statute were avail-
able to the state and that even the likelihood that such prosecutions 
would ultimately fail would not mitigate "chilling effect on pro-
tected expression."39 Thus, in light of Dombrowski and other recent 
cases40 and of the chilling effect of the order involved in NAGE, 
it would appear probable that a court would be willing to grant 
a declaratory judgment to a labor organization concerning the 
constitutionality of Executive Order 11,491's broad antipicketing 
provision.41 
However, in a series of cases decided on February 23, 1971, the 
Supreme Court appeared to restrict the application of the doctrine 
enunciated in Dombrowski. The Court stated, in Younger v. Harris,42 
"We do not think that [the Dombrowski] opinion stands for the 
proposition that a federal court can properly enjoin enforcement of a 
statute solely on the basis of a showing that the statute 'on its face' 
37. 380 U.S. at 492. 
38. 380 U.S. at 486, quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
39. 380 U.S. at 494. 
40. See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), in which the Court similarly 
refused to apply the ripeness doctrine in a declaratory-judgment action challenging the 
constitutionality of several Washington loyalty oath statutes; NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 435 (1963), in which the Court stated, "It makes no difference whether such 
prosecutions or proceedings would actually be commenced. It is enough that a vague 
and broad statute [restricting freedom of expression] lends itself to selective enforce-
ment against unpopular causes." 
41. See National Assn. of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1969), 
prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 1962 (1970) (No. 1270), in which a district court granted 
declaratory relief to a labor organization challenging the constitutionality of a part of 
5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1964), relating to the right of federal employees to "assert the right to 
strike" against the United States, or belong to a labor organization that does so. The 
United States recently agreed to drop its appeal in this case. G.E.R.R. No. 365, at Al0 
(Sept. 7, 1970). 
42. 39 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971). 
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abridges First Amendment rights."48 It should be emphasized that 
each of these cases involved plaintiffs against whom criminal pro-
ceedings actually had been initiated in state courts for violations of 
state statutes and city ordinances. In refusing to uphold or grant 
injunctions against these state prosecutions· on the grounds that such 
prosecutions would infringe first amendment rights, the Court em-
phasized its "long-standing public policy against federal court inter-
ference with state court proceedings. "44 Since the focus of the Younger 
group of cases appears to be on the preservation of the integrity of 
the federal system and of state court proceedings rather than on 
ripeness, these decisions do not necessarily prevent a federal court 
from declaring a federal statute or executive order unconstitutional 
before an actual violation has occurred. Nevertheless, the tenor of 
the cases suggests that a challenge to Executive Order 11,491 would 
most wisely be litigated after federal employees had engaged in pic-
keting and had been disciplined-as in NAGE. 
III. PRIVATE-SECTOR PICKETING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Once the jurisdictional issues involved in a challenge of Execu-
tive Order 11,491, have been decided, the substantive question re-
mains whether that order violates the first amendment. In order 
to deal properly with this issue, it is necessary to examine the his-
tory of the first amendment's protection of picketing and of 
public-employee conduct. This Note will first discuss the application 
of the first amendment to labor picketing in the private sector. 
During the past thirty-four years, labor picketing has been the 
subject of a great deal of controversial constitutional analysis. In 
1937, the Supreme Court, while upholding the constitutionality of 
the Wisconsin "little Norris-LaGuardia" anti-injunction act's protec-
tion of peaceful labor picketing, recognized that "[m]embers of a 
union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make 
known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaran-
teed by the Federal Constitution."45 Although this statement by 
Justice Brandeis had not been made specifically in reference to 
picketing itself, it was interpreted by many lawyers as implying "that 
picketing-at least, peaceful picketing-is freedom of speech entitled 
to the guarantees of the federal Constitution."46 Actually, such a con-
43. 39 U.SL.W. at 4206. See also Boyle v. Landry, 39 U.S.L.W. 4207 (U.S. Feb, 23, 
1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 39 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 39 
U.S.L.W. 4214 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971); Dyson v. Stein, 39 U.S.L.W. 4231 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971); 
Byrne v. Karalexis, 39 U.S.L.W. 4236 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971). 
44. Younger v. Harris, 39 U.S.L.W. 4201, 4203 (U.S. Feb, 23, 1971). 
45. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937). 
46. C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 295 (1961). 
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clusion was not accepted by the Court until 1940 in Thornhill v. 
Alabama;n 
Thornhill involved a state statute that was interpreted by state 
courts as rendering peaceful labor picketing a misdemeanor. The 
Court stated that the first amendment protected the right publicly to 
discuss public issues and that "the dissemination of information 
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within 
that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution."48 
It was the Court's opinion that public streets provide natural places 
to disseminate information relating to labor disputes and that they 
do not become inappropriate places merely because such dissemina-
tion could take place elsewhere.49 In concluding that the Alabama 
statute was unconstitutionally broad, the Court emphasized that it 
had been 
applied by the State courts so as to prohibit a single individual from 
walking slowly and peacefully back and forth on the public side-
walk in front of the premises of an employer, without speaking to 
anyone, carrying a sign or placard on a staff above his head stating 
only that the employer did not employ union men .... The statute 
as thus authoritatively construed and applied leaves room for no 
exceptions based upon either the number of persons engaged in the 
proscribed activity, the peaceful character of their demeanor, the 
nature of their dispute with an employer, or the restrained character 
and the accurateness of the terminology used in notifying the public 
of the facts of the dispute.ro 
Although Thornhill and subsequent cases61 had provided peace-
ful labor picketing with the protections of the first amendment, it 
was clear that such protection was not absolute. In Cantwell v. 
Connecticut,52 the Court had declared that "[w]hen clear and present 
danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public 
streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, 
appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious."53 
This reasoning was followed in Milk Wagon Drivers, Local 753 v. 
47. 810 U.S. 88 (1940). 
48. 810 U.S. at 102. To support this statement, the Court cited Hague v. CIO, 
807 U.S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 155, 162·63 (1939); Senn v. Tile 
Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937). 
49. 310 U.S. at 103, 105-06. 
50. 810 U.S. at 98-99. 
51. In Carlson v. California, 810 U.S. 106 (1940), the Court further recoguized the 
free speech aspect of labor picketing by invalidating another overly broad state anti-
picketing statute. It noted that "[t]he carrying of sigus and banners, no less than the 
raising of a flag, is a natural and appropriate means of conveying information on 
matters of public concern." 810 U.S. at 112-18. See also Bakery Drivers Loca~ 802 v. 
Wohl, 815 U.S. 769 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 812 U.S. 287 (1941). 
52. 810 U.S. 296 (1940). 
58. 810 U.S. at 808. 
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Meadowmoor Dairies, Incorporated, 54 in which a broad state court 
injunction against picketing was upheld due to the pervasive acts 
of violence that had accompanied the picketing. While the Court 
recognized that the "[r]ight to free speech in the future cannot be 
forfeited because of dissociated acts of past violence,"55 it emphasized 
that the picketing involved in that case had been "set in a back-
ground of violence."56 The Court therefore concluded that the 
state could justifiably enjoin future picketing in that particular labor 
dispute.57 
In 1942, the Court appeared to diverge more fundamentally from 
the broad free speech approach to picketing embodied in Thornhill 
when it upheld a state court injunction of labor picketing issued on 
grounds other than violence. In Carpenters, Local 213 v. Ritters 
Cafe,58 a union picketed Ritter's restaurant solely for the purpose of 
protesting his hiring of a non-union contractor to erect an unrelated 
building 1 ½ miles from the restaurant. The picketing, which caused 
a cessation of work and deliveries at the restaurant, was found to 
be for the purpose of forcing Ritter to require the nonunion contrac-
tor to employ only union members and therefore to be in violation 
of the state antitrust law.59 In upholding the state court injunction 
against picketing of the restaurant itself, the Supreme Court stated 
that 
recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech does 
not imply that the states must be without power to confine the 
sphere of communication to that directly related to the dispute. 
Restriction of picketing to the area of the industry within which a 
labor dispute arises leaves open to the disputants other traditional 
modes of communication.60 
Thus, by applying the "unlawful-purpose" doctrine,61 the Court in 
Ritter's Cafe appeared to accept the notion that labor picketing con-
stitutes more than "pure speech." 
Although the Court had in several instances during the l 940's 
54. 312 U.S. 287 (1941). 
55. 312 U.S. at 296. Prior restraints on free speech are discussed in Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW 8: 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955); Glenn, Censorship at Common Law and Under Modern 
Dispensation, 82 U. PA. L. REY. 114 (1933). 
56. 312 U.S. at 294. 
57. 312 U.S. at 294-95. 
58. 315 U.S. 722 (1942). 
59. 315 U.S. at 723-24. 
60. 315 U.S. at 727-28. 
61. See Giboney v. Empire Storage 8c Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), in which the Court 
further developed the unlawful-purpose doctrine by noting that there is no "constitu-
tional right in picketers to take advantage of speech or press to violate valid laws 
designed to protect important interests of society." 336 U.S. at 501. 
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upheld state court antipicketing injunctions when a "clear and 
present danger" of violence or coercion accompanied the picketing62 
or when the primary purpose of the picketing was the accomplish-
ment of an illegal objective,63 it usually adhered to the Thornhill 
premise that peaceful labor picketing was subject to the full protec-
tion of the first amendment.64 However, by 1950, it was apparent 
that the Court was having difficulty with the "pure speech" concept 
and was beginning to re-examine its Thornhill doctrine. In Hughes 
v. Superior Court of the State of California,65 the Court upheld a 
state court injunction against picketing that had been aimed at 
forcing local businessmen to hire a minimum percentage of Negro 
workers; such coercion was held to be in violation of a state anti-
discrimination policy. 66 Although the established unlawful-purpose 
doctrine clearly covered the situation, the Court utilized the occasion 
to indicate in dictum its belief that 
[i]ndustrial picketing "is more than free speech, since it involves 
patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket 
line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of 
the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated." . . . [T]he 
very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces 
consequences, different from other modes of communication.67 
In two companion cases, the Court further emphasized that it did not 
consider peaceful picketing to be pure speech. In Teamsters, Local 
309 v. Hanke,68 while upholding a similar state court injunction 
against peaceful picketing that interfered with an established state 
policy, the Court recognized that picketing "cannot dogmatically be 
equated with the constitutionally protected freedom of speech."69 
The Court concluded that it had "to strike a balance between the 
62. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 54-57 supra. 
63. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 58-60 supra. 
64. See, e.g., Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943), in which 
the Supreme Court invalidated a state court injunction against labor picketing despite 
the fact that the picketing had earlier been accompanied by a few acts of coercion. The 
Court concluded that "the right to picket itself [cannot] be taken away merely because 
there may have been isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of violence occurring 
in the course of that picketing.'' 320 U.S. at 296. 
For analyses of the labor picketing cases of the early I940's see C. GREGORY, supra 
note 46, ch. XI; Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REv. 
513 (1943); Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 26 A.B.A.J. 709 (1940); 
Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 MICH. L. REv. 1037 
(1943); Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 HARv. L. REV. 180 (1942); Teller, Picketing 
and Free Speech: A Reply, 56 HARv. L. REv. 532 (1943). 
65. 339 U.S. 460 (1950). 
66. 339 U.S. at 468-69. 
67. 339 U.S. at 464-65, quoting Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 
775 (1942) Oustice Douglas, concurring). 
68. 339 U.S. 470 (1950). 
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constitutional protection of the element of communication in picket-
ing and 'the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest 
open to industrial combatants.' "70 Similar language was used by 
the Court in Building Service Employees, Local 262 v. Gazzam,11 in 
which it also upheld a state court antipicketing injunction by use of 
the unlawful-purpose doctrine. Thus, it appeared that although 
Thornhill had not been specifically overruled, its underlying ra-
tionale had been significantly eroded.72 
Throughout most of the 1950's, the Court continued to recognize 
that labor picketing constituted much more than pure speech for 
constitutional purposes.73 However, in 1958 the Court demonstrated 
that it still intended to accord peaceful labor picketing some consti-
tutional protection. In Teamsters, Local 795 v. Newell,14 the Court 
in a per curiam decision invalidated a broad state court antipicketing 
injunction and cited Thornhill v. Alabama. Further evidence of the 
Court's refusal to reject entirely the Thornhill doctrine was provided 
69. 339 U.S. at 474. 
70. 339 U.S. at 474, quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, lHO U.S. 88, 104 (1940). 
71. 339 U.S. 532 (1950). 
72. For some interesting analyses of the Supreme Court's treatment of picketing 
through the 1950's, see Cox, The Influence of Mr. Justice Murphy on Labor Law, 48 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 767, 774-82, 787-93 (1950); Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-Constitutionally 
Protected?, 99 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1 (1950); Gordon, Giboney v. Empire Storage if Ice Co.: 
A Footnote to Free Speech, 36 VA. L. R.Ev. 25 (1950); Gregory, Constitutional Limitations 
on the Regulation of Union and Employer Conduct, 49 MICH. L. R.Ev. 191, 198-208 
(1950); Gregory, Picketing and Coercion: A Defense, 39 VA. L. R.Ev. 1053 (1953); Gregory, 
Picketing and Coercion: A Conclusion, 39 VA. L. R.Ev. 1067 (1953); Jones, Picketing and 
Coercion: A Jurisprudence or Epithets, 39 VA. L. R.Ev. 1023 (1953); Jones, The Right 
To Picket-Twilight Zone of the Constitution, 102 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 995 (1954); Rehmus, 
Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 30 CRE. L. R.Ev. 115 (1951); Smith, The Supreme 
Court and Labor, 1950-1953, 8 Sw. L.J. I, 10-11 (1954); Tanenhaus, Picketing-Free 
Speech: The Growth of the New Law of Picketing from 1940-1952, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 1 
(1952); Comment, Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law-Thornhill Re-examined, 49 
Mica. L. R.Ev. 1048 (1951). See also Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. 
L. R.Ev. 574, 591-602 (1951); Jones, Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! Amidst 
Confusion, A Consistent Principle, 29 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 137 {1956); Jones, The Loder 
Letter-Have Union Picketers Finally Found the Formula, 44 UCLA L. R.Ev. 370 (1957); 
Jones, Picketing and the Communication of Ideas, 42 UCLA L. R.Ev. 212 (1955). 
73. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. 8: Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); 
Plumbers Union v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 
354 U.S. 284 (1957); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957). 
74. 356 U.S. 341 (1958) (per curiam). See also NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639, 362 
U.S. 274 (1960), in which the Court held that peaceful "recognition" picketing does 
not "restrain or coerce" employees within the meaning of § 8(b)(l)(A) of the National 
Labor Relations Act [hereinafter NLRA], 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1964). That section 
makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to "restrain or coerce" employees in the 
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by the NLRA. Section 8(b)(7) of the NLRA, 29 
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1964), now regulates recognitional and organizational picketing. See 
Smitley d/b/a Crown Cafeteria v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1964), regarding the 
right of a union to engage in § 8(b)(7) picketing "for the purpose of truthfully advising 
the public •••• " See also Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National 
Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. R.Ev. 257, 265-70 (1959). 
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six years later in NLRB v. Fruit b Vegetable Packers b Warehouse-
men, Local 760 (Tree Fruits),75 a case involving the relationship be-
tween peaceful consumer picketing and the prohibition of secondary 
picketing contained in section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA).76 In that case, the Court interpreted the scope of 
section 8(b)(4) in a narrow manner in order to avoid the constitu-
tional issue that otherwise would have been presented, because it 
recognized that "a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide 
with the guarantees of the First Amendment."77 The Court's consti-
tutional struggle with labor picketing continued in Amalgamated 
Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, lncorpo-
rated.18 Although the Court began its analysis in that case "from the 
premise that peaceful picketing carried on in a location open gen-
erally to the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose or 
manner of the picketing, protected by the First Amendment,"79 it 
noted that prior decisions had recognized that "picketing involves 
elements of both speech and conduct, i.e., patrolling, and [had] in-
dicated that because of this intermingling of protected and unpro-
tected elements, picketing [ could] be subjected to controls that 
would not be constitutionally permissible in the case of pure 
speech."80 However, it emphasized that "no case ... can be found to 
support the proposition that the non-speech aspects of peaceful 
picketing are so great as to render the provisions of the First Amend-
ment inapplicable to it altogether.''81 Since the peaceful picketing in-
volved in Logan Valley was not aimed at achieving an illegal objec-
tive, the Court concluded that it was within the protection afforded 
by the first amendment. 82 
IV. PICKETING BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
Although it is clear from the preceding discussion of the relevant 
Supreme Court decisions that peaceful labor picketing by private-
sector employees is entitled to at least some first amendment protec-
75. '!,77 U.S. 58 (1964). 
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964). See note 74 supra. "Secondary picketing" involves 
picketing of an employer not involved in the labor dispute. Brotherhood of R.R. Train• 
men v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., '!,94 U.S. '!,69, '!,88 (1969). 
77. '!,77 U.S. at 6'!,. But cf. Lewis, Consumer Picketing and the Supreme Court-The 
Questionable Yield of Tree Fruits, 49 Mnm. L. REv. 479 (1965). 
78. '!,91 U.S. '!,08 (1968). 
79. '!,91 U.S. at '!,I'!,, citing Teamsters, Local 795 v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958); Bakery 
Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, '!,15 U.S. 769 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
80. 391 U.S. at 31'!,. 
81. 391 U.S. at 314. 
82. 391 U.S. at 314-15. 
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tion, there are special circumstances present with respect to 
public-sector employees that should be considered. Unlike private-
sector employees, whose right to strike is protected by section 13 of 
the NLRA,83 federal government employees are prohibited from 
engaging in work stoppages of any kind.84 It is highly probable, 
therefore, that if federal workers were to engage in peaceful picketing 
in conjunction with an illegal strike, the picketing could be constitu-
tionally enjoined-along with the strike-as being in furtherance of 
an illegal activity.85 Conversely, when peaceful labor picketing by fed-
eral employees is neither in furtherance of a strike, nor aimed at the 
achievement of an unlawful objective, it may be contended that such 
activity should be afforded greater first amendment protection than 
is afforded most private-sector labor picketing. Although private-sec-
tor labor picketing is at least partially communicative in nature, it is 
frequently used as a "signal" to induce fellow union members to 
cease doing business with the picketed employer.86 Because federal 
employees may not legally utilize picketing for such purposes,87 they 
are restricted to engaging in only pure informational picketing. Con-
sequently, such activity more closely resembles nonlabor picketing 
than labor picketing. It may therefore be contended that the consti-
tutional protection afforded their activity should be determined by 
reference to Supreme Court decisions that have involved nonlabor 
picketing. 
Although the Court has applied the unlawful-purpose doctrine88 
to some areas of nonlabor picketing when the governmental interest 
being protected was substantial, 89 the Court has often provided 
greater constitutional protection for this type of picketing than for 
labor picketing. For example, in Edwards v. South Carolina,90 the 
Court overturned a state breach-of-peace conviction of 187 blacks 
who had engaged in peaceful informational picketing at the South 
Carolina Statehouse in protest of racial segregation.91 The Court 
83. 29 u.s.c. § 163 (1964). 
84. See 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1964), which prohibits strikes by federal employees; 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1918 (1964), which authorizes the imposition of penalties for violations of 5 U.S.C. § 
7311. 
85. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Local Union 110, 233 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Ky. 
1962). See also Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev. 391, 441 
n.118 (1961). 
86. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. 8: Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). See 
also Cox, 48 MICH. L. R.Ev. 767, supra note 72, at 787-93; Cox, 4 VAND. L REY. 574, 
supra note 72, at 591-602. 
87. See note 84 and text accompanying note 85 supra. 
88. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra. 
89. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 
(1950), discussed in text accompanying notes 65-67 supra. See also Cameron v. Johnson, 
390 U.S. 611 (1968). 
90. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
91. 372 U.S. at 237. 
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emphasized that the demonstration involved no violence or threat of 
violence on the part of either the demonstrators or the white 
onlookers and that there was ample police protection.92 In holding 
that a conviction under these circumstances could not stand-despite 
the volatile nature of racial demonstrations in the South-Justice 
Stewart, speaking for the majority, observed that the Constitution 
"does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of 
unpopular views."93 The Court then quoted extensively from Ter-
miniello v. Chicago94 ; 
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to 
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it 
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions 
as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative 
and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and 
have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an 
idea. That is why freedom of speech . . . is . . • protected against 
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear 
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above 
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. . . . There is no room 
under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alterna-
tive would lead to standardization of ideas, either by legislatures, 
courts, or dominant political or community groups.95 
Since the atmosphere surrounding peaceful nonstrike informational 
picketing in a public-employee labor dispute is normally far less 
volatile than that which surrounded southern racial demonstrations 
92. 372 U.S. at 235-36. 
93. 372 U.S. at 237. 
94. 337 U.S. I, 4-5 (1949). In Terminiello, the Court set aside a breach-of-peace con-
viction of a speaker who "vigorously, if not viciously" criticized certain political and 
racial groups. Demonstrators outside the auditorium in which the defendant spoke had 
reacted by tossing stink bombs, breaking windows, and trying to tear clothes off mem-
bers of the audience. 
95. 372 U.S. at 237-38. See Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964). See also 
Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HARV. L. REv. 391, 4II (1961), in which 
it is urged that purely informational picketing by public employees should "fall within 
the constitutional protection of free speech and of the right to petition the government 
for redress of grievances." 
Of course, even if peaceful public-employee picketing were afforded full first 
amendment protection, it would still be subject to the same limitations as is all "pure 
speech." See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ("clear and present 
danger" test); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (same); Yates v. United States, 
354 U.S. 298 (1957) (distinguishing between mere "advocacy" and actual "incitement" 
of violence); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity). See also Gorfinkel &: 
Mack, Dennis v. United States and the Clear and Present Danger Rule, 39 CALIF. L. 
REv. 475 (1951); Lockhart &: McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Con-
stitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960); Lockhart &: McClure, Literature, the 
Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295 (1954); Mendelson, Clear 
and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 Courn. L. REv. 313 (1952); Richard-
son, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1951). 
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during the early 1960's, it seems clear that the approach adopted in 
Edwards protects both forms of picketing. 
The Edwards approach strongly indicates that federal employees 
should be at least afforded the constitutionally protected right to 
engage in peaceful informational picketing in order to bring the 
pressure of public opinion to bear on their labor dispute when 
economic weapons-such as strikes-are unavailable. Nevertheless, 
it may be argued that by accepting employment with the Govern-
ment, federal employees forfeit such a privilege.96 In United Public 
Workers v. Mitchell,91 a case concerning the constitutionality of the 
Hatch Act's prohibition of federal employees from engaging in politi-
cal activity,98 the Court observed: "Congress and the administrative 
agencies have authority over the discipline and efficiency of the 
public service. When actions of civil servants in the judgment of 
Congress menace the integrity and the competency of the service, 
legislation to forestall such danger and adequate to maintain its use-
fulness is required."99 The Court therefore upheld the constitution-
ality of the Hatch Act restrictions.100 In Adler v. Board of Educa-
tion,101 the Court upheld against similar constitutional attack the 
New York Feinberg Law,102 which required loyalty oaths of schooJ 
teachers. Although the Court asserted in Adler that such public 
employees "have no right to work for the State in the school 
system on their own terms,"103 it subsequently stated, in Wieman 
v. Updegraff,104 that "constitutional protection does extend to the 
public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently 
arbitrary or discriminatory."105 But, despite the language used by the 
Court, more recent decisions seem to indicate that when the efficiency 
96. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), 
which upheld the discharge of a policeman for engaging in prohibited political activity. 
The court noted: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but 
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." See also Eic parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 
371 (1882), which upheld a similar restriction on the rights of certain federal employees. 
97. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the jurisdictional issue in this case. 
98. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, § 9, 53 Stat. 1148, as amended 5 U.S.C. § 118i (1964). 
99. 330 U.S. at 103. 
100. 330 U.S. at 103. Cf. Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, in which he stated 
that "[a]bsent coercion, improper use of government position or government funds, or 
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty, federal employees have the same 
rights as do other citizens under the Constitution. They are not second-class citizens." 
330 U.S. at 124. 
101. 342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
102. N.Y. Enuc. LAW§ 3022 (McKinney 1949). 
103. 342 U.S. at 492. The Court commented that persons "may work for the school 
system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of New York." 
842 U.S. at 492. See also Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D,C. Cir. 1950), afjd. per 
curiam by equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). 
104. 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
105. 344 U.S. at 192, 
April 1971] Notes 973 
or integrity of the public service is involved, it will permit some 
restriction on the constitutional rights of the public employees in-
volved. 
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of 
New York,106 the Court severely restricted the right of a state to 
abridge, through loyalty oath requirements, the first amendment 
rights of public employees. In holding that a state could not dismiss 
a state university professor merely for his knowing membership in 
the Communist Party without a showing of specific intent to further 
the party's unlawful aims,107 the Court noted that "the theory that 
public employment which may be denied altogether may be sub-
jected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been 
uniformly rejected."108 The implication in this statement that some 
reasonable restrictions on the rights of public employees would be 
constitutionally permissible was fortified in Pickering v. Board of 
Education of Township High School District 205.109 Although the 
Court in that case purportedly rejected the notion that public 
employees may constitutionally be required to waive rights of free 
speech enjoyed by private citizens, it recognized that 
the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its 
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connec-
tion with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The 
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests 
of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters 
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through 
its employees.110 
Thus, despite the fact that the Court is willing to permit some restric-
tions on the constitutional rights of public employees when dictated 
by the requirements of efficiency and integrity, it is clear that it will 
not tolerate unreasonable infringement of fundamental freedoms. In 
Pickering, for example, the Court found that the activity that had 
been engaged in-writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing 
the way the school board and superintendent had handled proposals 
to raise school revenue111-had interfered with neither the perfor-
mance of the public employee's duties nor the general operation 
106. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
107. 385 U.S. at 606,10. 
108. 385 U.S. at 605,06, citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 860 (1964): Cramp v. Board 
of Pub. Instruction, 386 U.S. 278 (1961): Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); 
Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956): Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 
(1952). 
109. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
110. 391 U.S. at 568. 
111. 391 U.S. at 564. 
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of the public service.112 It concluded that in such circumstances, "the 
interest of the ... administration in limiting [the public employee's] 
opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly 
greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any 
member of the general public.''113 Therefore, the Court held unrea-
sonable the infringement of the employee's first amendment rights.114 
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11,491 
With this background of the applicability of the first amendment 
to picketing and to public employees in mind, the reasonableness of 
Executive Order ll,491's broad antilabor picketing provision may 
properly be considered. The language of section 19(b)(4) of the order 
clearly prohibits all labor picketing of Government agencies; it is not 
confined to situations either where there is a "clear and present dan-
ger" of disruption of the public service115 or where the picketing is 
intended to achieve an illegal objective.116 Thus, even accepting the 
narrow premise that peaceful labor picketing involves more than free 
speech, it is submitted that Executive Order ll,491's provision is 
unreasonably restrictive. 
In United States v. O'Brien,111 the Court recognized that when an 
individual's conduct involves both speech and nonspeech elements, 
first amendment freedoms may be incidentally restricted if the 
government has a strong interest in regulating the nonspeech ele-
ment.118 The Court stated that such regulation is justified "if it is 
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
112. 391 U.S. at 570-75. 
I 13. 391 U.S. at 572-73. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 
U.S. 508 (1969), which involved the right of school authorities to restrict the free expres-
sion of pupils. The Court commented in that case that "where there is no finding and 
no showing that the exercise of the forbidden right would 'materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,' 
the prohibition cannot be sustained." 393 U.S. at 509. 
114. 391 U.S. at 574-75. See also Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 902 (7th Cir. 1970) 
(Chicago Police Department rule prohibiting police from "[e]ngaging in any activity, 
conversation, deliberation, or discussion which is derogatory to the Department or any 
member or policy of the Department" held unconstitutionally broad); Melton v. City of 
Atlanta, 39 U.S.L.W. 2469 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 1971) (Georgia state statute prohibiting 
policemen from joining a labor union held unconstitutional under first and fourteenth 
amendments). 
115. See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra. 
116. See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text. 
117. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In this case, the Court upheld convictions under federal law 
of three young men for burning their draft cards. 
118. 391 U.S. at 376. 
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greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."119 This 
statement is consistent with the well-established doctrine that 
a legitimate and substantial governmental purpose cannot be pur-
sued by means that unnecessarily abridge fundamental first amend-
ment liberties; such an abridgment offends the Constitution if the 
governmental purpose that it is intended to further could be accom-
plished through less drastic means.120 
It is not contended that restrictions on federal-employee labor 
picketing may never be imposed; indeed, an Executive Order could 
properly be drafted that would prevent the utilization of labor pick-
eting either to disrupt governmental services-as is already pro-
hibited by existing law121-or to aid in the achievement of an illegal 
objective.122 However, it is submitted that such specific restrictions 
would sufficiently protect government interests to render unnecessary 
-and hence constitutionally impermissible-an order prohibiting 
all federal-employee picketing. A narrow order, which would pro-
hibit disruptive and unlawful-purpose picketing, would prevent 
picketing by federal employees pursuant to unlawful strikes but 
would allow nondisruptive informational picketing such as that 
involved in NAGE.123 Since a narrow order would accomplish the 
Government's interest in "promoting the efficiency of the public 
services,"124 the broader Executive Order 11,491-which unneces-
sarily restricts federal employees' first amendment rights to freedom 
of expression-is "greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest"125 and is therefore unconstitutional. 
There is yet another reason why the right of federal employees to 
engage in peaceful labor picketing that does not seek the achieve-
ment of an unlawful objective should not be restricted. When 
federal workers are dissatisfied with their present working conditions 
they must look to their employer-the federal government-for 
II9. 391 U.S. at 376-77. 
120. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 
17 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 
500 (1964); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Freund, Competing 
Freedoms in American Constitutional Law, 13 U. CHI. CoNF. SER. 26, 32-33 (1953); 
Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1, 6, 
23-24 (1951), cited by the Court in Shelton at 364 U.S. at 488 n.9. 
121. See note 84 supra. A three-judge district court recently held that the first 
and fifth amendments do not bar an absolute ban on strikes by federal employees. 
Postal Clerks v. Blount, 39 U.S. L.W. 2565 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 1971). 
122, See note 61 and text accompanying notes 58-60 supra. 
123. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra. 
124. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). See text accompanying 
note IIO supra. 
125. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See text accompanying note 
119 supra. 
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proper redress of their grievances. A century ago, in United States v. 
Cruikshank,126 the Court recognized: 
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of 
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else 
connected with the powers or duties of the national government, is 
an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protec-
tion of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a 
government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its 
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs 
and to petition for a redress of grievances.127 
Although it might be argued that the constitutional right to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances was not intended to apply 
when there is an employee-employer relationship between the 
petitioner and the federal government, it is submitted that such a 
conclusion would impose an unreasonable "second-class" citizen-
ship128 upon such employees. This proposition is supported by the 
Supreme Court's statement in Pickering v. Board of Education that 
a government's interest in limiting a public employee's right to 
exercise nondisruptive freedom of expression is no greater than its 
interest in limiting the similar rights of private citizens.129 It should 
also be emphasized that by permitting federal employees to petition 
the Government-i.e., their employer-through resort to peaceful in-
formational picketing for redress of labor grievances, the general 
public may be benefited since the possible expedient alleviation of 
the conditions that are disturbing the employees will best insure the 
smooth and efficient operation of the public service.130 
The Supreme Court recently stated in United States v. Robel:131 
For almost two centuries, our country has taken singular pride in 
the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution, and the most 
cherished of those ideals have found expression in the First Amend-
ment. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, 
126. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
127. 92 U.S. at 553. 
128. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 124 (1947) Oustice Douglas, dis-
senting). See note 100 and text accompanying note 1 supra. 
129. 391 U.S. at 568. See text accompanying note 110 supra. 
130. The great importance of nondisruptive dispute settlement measures was 
illustrated by the devastating consequences of the recent postal strike and of the air 
traffic controller "slowdown." See N.Y. Times, March 23, 1970, at 1, cols. 6-8; id., March 
22, 1970, at 1, cols. 7-8; id., March 21, 1970, at 1, cols. 5-8; id., March 20, 1970, at 1, 
cols. 6-8; id., March 19, 1970, at 1, cols. 7-8. See also G.E.R.R. No. 341, at A5-A8 
(March 23, 1970). 
131. 389 U.S. 258 (1967). Robel involved a conviction under § 5(a)(l)(D) of the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(l)(D) (1964), of a member of 
the Communist Party for having willfully engaged in employment at a shipyard after 
the Secretary of Defense had designated it a defense facility. 
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we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties . 
which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.132 
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It would similarly be ironic if the Government were permitted to 
stifle the free expression of its employees in order to prevent its being 
embarrassed in the eyes of public opinion by federal-employee picket-
ing. Yet this is apparently the principal-if not the only-objective 
achieved by the very broad labor picketing prohibition contained 
in section 19(b)(4).1aa 
In conclusion, it is submitted that section 19(b)(4) of Executive 
Order 11,491 clearly exceeds the bounds of reasonable regulation, 
thereby impermissibly infringing the first amendment rights of 
Government workers. Therefore, a federal court should not hesitate 
to take jurisdiction over a federal-employee union's challenge of that 
order and to provide the relief required in order fully to protect the 
fundamental rights of Government employees. 
132. 389 U.S. at 264. See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
133. As was demonstrated by the NAGE employees in New York City, there need be 
no disruption of the public service when federal workers engage in peaceful picketing. 
See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text. 
